The roots of the 2008 war go back to the early 1990s when the Soviet and then Russian security agencies treated Georgia in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia in a manner similar to how they treated Ukraine in the Donbass region in 2014. Local separatists were developed, encouraged, supported and directed. When that was not enough, Russia involved itself in the conflict more directly. The final result was that most of Abkhazia and a large part of Tskhinvali Region were placed under an indirect Russian control through Moscow-backed rebels while most of the numerous Georgian population of Abkhazia was expelled as a result of a brutal ethnic cleansing.
Unlike modern Ukraine, Georgia of the early 1990s was largely diplomatically isolated. As a result, Russia succeeded in strong-arming it into accepting the presence of Russian peacekeepers in both regions. In Abkhazia, the peacekeepers were all Russian troops. In Tskhinvali Region/ South Ossetia, the peacekeeping format was more peculiar and included three battalions: one from the Russian regular armed forces, an armed unit formally representing the Russian Federation’s region of North OssetiaAlania and a battalion from the Georgian armed forces.
Russia’s subsequent policy towards Georgia was bad enough under the administration of Boris Yeltsin but when Vladimir Putin became Russia’s Prime Minister in August 1999 and then President in the spring of 2000, things got even worse.
Relations between Russia and Georgia steadily deteriorated during Putin’s rule. The Russian steps during the years up to February 2008 included, 5 among many others: the construction and development of military bases on Georgian territory beyond the control of its government; the Russian General Staff’s preparation of the plan for a war against Georgia; arming, organizing and training rebel militias; bombings of Georgian territory by the Russian military aircraft; meetings of Russian officials, including Putin himself, with Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia rebel leaders; political preparation for the recognition of the independence of these two Georgian regions; appointment of Russian military and security officers and other Russian citizens to top leadership positions within the rebel regimes, especially the one in Tskhinvali and the distribution of Russian citizenship to residents of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region.
Diplomatic Escalation in 2008
The sharp escalation of events in 2008 specifically followed Kosovo’s declaration of independence on February 17, 2008 and its subsequent recognition by most of the Western nations. Russia reacted as if it were a signal to move to a new stage of its actions against Georgia. Moscow’s next steps followed in quick succession.
On March 6, Russia withdrew from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) agreement dating to 1996 which banned military, political and economic relations with Abkhazia’s rebels by CIS member states. On March 21, the Russian State Duma (parliament) “adopted a resolution urging the government to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia and to protect its ‘citizens’ in these regions.” On April 3, Putin sent a letter to the rebel leaders, promising to support them by means “not declarative but practical.”
The Russians where quite open about the connection between their actions in Georgia and Kosovo’s independence. Even before the recognition of Kosovo, Yuri Baluyevsky, Chief of the Russian General Staff, said that such recognition would “echo in other regions as well, including those close to Russia’s borders,” specifying then that he actually meant “Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria.” Behind closed doors the Kremlin’s message was the same, as the President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, discovered during his last meeting with Putin in February 2008 when the Russian President declared to his Georgian colleague that in response to Kosovan independence Russia would further undermine Georgia’s sovereignty in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Another trigger of Russia’s activity was the prospect of Georgia joining NATO which Moscow decided was unacceptable. Dmitry Rogozin, the Russian envoy to NATO, stated on March 11: “As soon as Georgia gets some kind of prospect from Washington of NATO membership, the next day the process of real secession of these two territories [Abkhazia and South Ossetia] from Georgia will begin.” After the release of the communiqué of the 20th NATO Summit in Bucharest on April 4, 2008, which promised Georgia eventual NATO membership at some point in future, the Russian President issued a statement saying that Russia would “provide effective assistance to South Ossetia and Abkhazia” in response to NATO’s decision. On April 8, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, stated that Russia would “do everything to prevent Ukraine and Georgia from joining NATO.”
Moscow’s major diplomatic blow against Georgia came on April 16, 2008 when Putin issued a decree instructing his government agencies to establish direct official relations with the rebel regimes in the two Georgian provinces. Georgia reacted by stating that Russia was seeking annexation of these Georgian regions. The EU, OSCE, NATO and the leading Western nations condemned Putin’s move as well.
Military Escalation in 2008 – Initial Moves
On April 17 – the next day after Putin issued his decree – 300 Russian troops arrived in Abkhazia and were stationed at a base in Ochamchire. The military escalation that culminated on August 7 with the start of the Russo-Georgian War had been launched.
On April 20, a Russian MIG-29 jet shot down an unarmed Georgian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) that was on a mission observing the Russian military buildup in Abkhazia. Investigation by the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia confirmed that the jet that carried out the attack was Russian. Several more Georgian UAVs were shot down in May.
Later in April, Moscow announced that it was deploying 400 troops of the 7th Air Assault Division (based in Novorossiysk) to Abkhazia. The move was made in violation of the CIS agreement on the peacekeeping operations. The Russian troops sent to Abkhazia in April 2008 belonged to the 108th Air Assault Regiment of the 7th Division. Additionally, two companies of the Russian Special Forces (Spetsnaz) were also deployed to Abkhazia while other Special Forces troops were sent to Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia. (See more on these Special Forces troops)
The troop movements were accompanied by transfers of weaponry into Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia. “Starting in late spring, the Georgians claim to have observed at least twenty-six large containers of Russian military equipment being brought into Abkhazia. Those illegal shipments included a large number of BMP/BTR armored vehicles, D-30 type howitzers, SA-11 BUK antiaircraft systems, BM-21 GRAD rocket systems, and ZSU-23-4 Shilka antiaircraft systems. Smaller quantities of the same weapons systems were imported into South Ossetia and prepositioned in the Java district.”
An important development occurred on May 31, 2008 when the Russian Defense Ministry announced the deployment of the Russian Railroad Troops to Abkhazia. The deployment involved 400 troops tasked with the rehabilitation of the railway between Sokhumi and Ochamchire – a town in close proximity to the Georgian government-controlled territory.
This move violated Russia’s peacekeeping mandate and was conducted despite the loud protests of the Georgian government. Georgia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Grigol Vashadze, commented that “no one needs to bring railway forces to the territory of another country unless a military intervention is being prepared.” Russia’s action was also criticized by the international community, including the European Parliament resolution of June 5, which stated that “the present peacekeeping format must be revised since the Russian troops have lost their role of neutral and impartial peacekeepers.” NATO Secretary-General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, said the deployment was “clearly in contravention of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” and “an escalating action by Russia.”
The Russian troops completed railway repairs between Sokhumi and Ochamchire on July 30 – about a week before Russia launched its campaign against Georgia on August 7. Later, during the war, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Matthew Bryza, said regarding the railroad troops: “Now we know the truth about why those forces were there. It was to rebuild the railroad to allow ammunition and other military supplies to aid a Russian invasion.”
The reality of the purposeful Russian preparation for a war against Georgia was later confirmed by retired Army General, former Russian First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of General Staff (until June 3, 2008), Yuri Baluyevsky, who served as the Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council during the Russo-Georgian War. In a 2012 Russian documentary film, entitled Lost Day, Baluyevsky stated that “a decision to invade Georgia had been made by Putin before Medvedev was inaugurated President and Commander-in-Chief in May 2008. A detailed plan of military action was arranged and unit commanders were given specific orders in advance.”
Some Western intelligence agencies correctly predicted the coming war. According to a senior U.S. intelligence official, ample warning regarding Russian hostile intentions against Georgia had been provided to the Bush administration. In March 2008, the intelligence service of one of the Baltic states was warning that Russia planned a war against Georgia later that year and correctly predicting that the Russian 58th Army and 76th Division would participate. Sweden’s signals intelligence service, the National Defense Radio Establishment (FRA), also predicted that Russia would attack Georgia. All of this, however, did not translate into the actual awareness of Russia’s intentions among the political leadership of the major Western states and did not influence their diplomatic policy.
Military Escalation in 2008 – Final Leap
In mid-June 2008, explosions and mine incidents took place “close to the Georgian-administrated villages of Kekhvi, Ergneti and Tamarasheni and the de facto South Ossetian militia post in Kokhati” with exchanges of fire “between the Georgian-administered villages of Sveri and Prisi and the South Ossetian-administered villages of Andzisi and Zemo Prisi respectively,” as well as “in the southern environs of Tskhinvali and nearby Georgian villages.”
On July 3, an explosion targeted the head of the administration of the Georgian-controlled part of Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia, Dmitry Sanakoyev, injuring several Georgian police officers, while another explosion killed a leader of the Tskhinvali militia. These incidents were followed by exchanges of fire during the night of July 3-4.
Four Russian military jets violated Georgian air space on July 8. Unlike the previous occasions of Georgian air space violations by the Russian aircraft, this time the Russian Foreign Ministry officially acknowledged the violation. This incident occurred on the eve of the July 9 visit to Georgia by the U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice.
On July 10, the commander of Russia’s North Caucasus Military District, Colonel-General Sergei Makarov, “announced that his troops were exercising for possible intervention in Abkhazia and/or South Ossetia, in the event that hostilities break out there.”
Russia launched large-scale Kavkaz-2008 military exercise in close proximity to the Georgian border on July 15. During the exercise, a leaflet, entitled Warrior, Know Your Probable Enemy, was distributed among the Russian troops. The leaflet contained information about the Georgian armed forces. The exercise ended on August 2 – five days before the Russian invasion into Georgia was launched.
According to an expert on Russian military affairs at Kansas State University, Dale Herspring, “this exercise was exactly what they [Russians] executed in Georgia just a few weeks later” and “a complete dress rehearsal.” Colonel Andrei Krasov from the Russian 76th Air Assault Division said in a later interview that during the exercise, the troops of the 76th Division “carefully studied all roads leading to the Roki Tunnel” on the Georgian border – the same tunnel that became the main route for the Russian invasion during the war, including for the 76th Division that featured prominently in the Russian offensive.
After the exercise, some Russian units “seem to have remained and deployed in a precautionary move near the Georgian border. Therefore, they could quickly move to South Ossetia through the Roki Tunnel when ordered to do so.” This was later confirmed by Anatoly Khrulyov – commander of the Russian 58th Army during the war, who was wounded in an encounter with Georgian troops on August 9, 2008. In his April 2012 interview, Khrulyov said that after the exercise “some units of the army did not go back to their barracks but stayed in the mountains near the approaches to the Roki Tunnel.”
The Russians also continued strengthening their forces in Abkhazia. In its late July-early August 2008 issue, the Russian magazine, Ogoniok, wrote about the influx of heavy armor and fuel trucks from Russia into Abkhazia. Journalist, Pavel Sheremet, reported from the Abkhazian portion of the Russian-Georgian border: “A dozen military trucks are crossing the border without stopping. Presently, they are mainly bringing fuel for military vehicles but a couple of weeks ago those vehicles themselves had entered Abkhazia. Military columns and echelons with tanks and armored personnel carriers were going day and night.”
From July 24 to 28, “several explosions occurred in the southern environs of Tskhinvali and in the Georgian-administered village of Avnevi, close to the post of the Georgian Peacekeeping Force (PKF) battalion.” From July 29 to 31, “exchanges of fire were reported between the Georgian-administered village of Sveri and the South Ossetian-administered village of Andzisi in the Sarabuki area” as well as “in the area of Khetagurovo between the South Ossetian militia post and the Georgian police post on the Georgian Avnevi-Zemo Nikozi by-pass road.”
“On 1 August, an improvised explosive device that went off on the Georgian Eredvi-Kheiti road by-passing Tskhinvali left five Georgian policemen injured. During the evening and night of 1-2 August, a series of intense and extensive exchanges of fire including sniper fire and mortar shelling occurred in the conflict zone, causing fatalities and casualties,” followed by more exchanges of fire during the nights of August 2-3 and August 3-4.
In the days just prior to the war, groups of armed militants from Russia entered Georgia. Tskhinvali rebel leader, Eduard Kokoity, said on August 4 that 300 “volunteers” from the Russian region of North Ossetia had arrived and that their number was expected to increase to 2,000. The next day, rebel representative, Dmitry Medoev, confirmed that “volunteers” from Russia were already arriving in Tskhinvali Region.
On August 5, the head of a state-affiliated Russian Cossack organization, Viktor Vodolatsky, who was also a member of the Russian Duma (parliament) from Putin’s United Russia ruling party and former deputy governor of the Rostov Oblast, said his organization was ready to send fighters to Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia to take part in a war against Georgia. Leaders of other Russian Cossack groups also expressed such readiness. After the war, Vodolatsky stated that the mobilization of “volunteers” was centrally planned and officially performed via drafting stations at the regional and district military commissariats in Russia’s North Caucasus with most of them assigned to the 19th Division of the regular Russian armed forces. On August 6, the Russian newspaper, Izvestia, reported “that volunteers were arriving to South Ossetia from as far away as Moscow.”
From the afternoon of August 6, “fire was exchanged along virtually the whole line of contact between the Georgian and South Ossetian sides, with particular hotspots in the Avnevi-Nuli-Khetagurovo area (west of Tskhinvali) and the Dmenisi-Prisi area (east of Tskhinvali).” The Georgian peacekeepers’ post on the Sarabuki heights came under fire, too, with three Georgian peacekeepers being injured. According to reports in the Russian media, a large number of Russian troops were moving southwards towards the Roki Tunnel on the Georgian border on August 6, the road being full with Russian military columns of trucks and armored vehicles.
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